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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the roles that political leaders have played in the
formulation and implementation of government initiatives to tackle poverty
and inequality in Brazil, China, India and South Africa since about 2002. While
research on social policy and welfare expansion in the industrialised world has
largely ignored leaders, we stress the importance of politics and political
agency, since political leaders often exercised decisive influence even if their
decisions to prioritise certain issues and to adopt certain strategies depend on
the convergence of other factors. We examine their management of tensions
and opposition within their governments and their political systems – as well
as what we can discern of their motivations and political calculations. We
consider the impact on government initiatives both of their adroit
machinations and, at times, of their ineptitude.
KEYWORDS Political leaders; social policy; Brazil; China; India; South Africa; rising powers
The aim of the research project from which this paper is derived was to
analyse the political and policy processes that from around 2002 led govern-
ments in Brazil, China, India and South Africa to intensify efforts to tackle
poverty and inequality – and their outcomes. Politics was central to our inves-
tigations – unavoidably, because it had a potent influence on events. Any
assessment of politics forces us to devote much of our attention to senior pol-
itical leaders because they possess significant power, although the limits on
their power also need to be carefully delineated. This chapter focuses on
them – on politicians at the apex of power, and at times on politicians, bureau-
crats and others just below, in the second tier.
We are not seeking here to revive the ‘greatman’ (or ‘great woman’) theory of
history. The leaders in these four countries faced multiple constraints, and had
personal limitations – they were not geniuses. They seldom dominated the
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political and policy processes. But we argue that they were sufficiently powerful
and adept to play key roles. Despite the many differences in their countries’ pol-
itical and socio-economic circumstances, in their precise reasons for tackling
poverty and inequality, and in the types of policies that they adopted, leaders
in all four countries concluded that efforts to address poverty and inequality
were necessary – because they recognised that poverty was pernicious and
that economicgrowthandglobalisationhad increased inequality. Theyalso reck-
oned that efforts to tackle these problems were feasible (politically, administra-
tively and financially). They believed that poverty initiatives would ease
destitution and discontents, and enhance their popularity and legitimacy – so
that they would serve their political interests. They therefore took significant
risks by investing political and financial capital in innovative policies and pro-
grammes. Some policies were more effective than others, and some leaders
were more adroit than others. But they all had a substantial impact and suc-
ceeded in redistributing wealth, reducing poverty and reaching the poorest of
the poor. (Reducing inequality was more difficult – see the paper on ‘Outcomes’
in this collection.)
By examining contrasts and commonalities across the four countries, this
comparative analysis seeks, in part, to broaden the perspectives of those
who focus on just one of these countries (or on any other single country). It
shows that certain important features of a researcher’s chosen country,
which they take for granted, are in fact distinctive, so that they merit
greater attention. It can enhance their understanding of how their political
system works, about the balance of forces within it, and about their own
habits of mind. Comparisons with other cases reveal policy options and pol-
itical choices that were rejected or never considered elsewhere. This
enables observers of any single country to see how things might have been
different – which in turn can broaden their view of the range of potential
actions and cast what did happen in a fresh light. But (to reiterate), despite
the many differences, political leaders in these countries had important
things in common. In all four cases – in different systems and settings,
where different leaders devised different policies – they evidently thought
that poverty and inequality had to be addressed for political if not social
reasons, and they demonstrated that it was possible by a diversity of means
to make a significant impact. These leaders cannot be ignored.
Although the study of leaders and leadership has declined in political
science (but see Ahlquist & Levi, 2011; Jervis, 2013), there is a stronger tra-
dition of examining the role of political leaders in foreign policy and inter-
national relations than in social policy. In international relations, work soon
evolved from a focus on how leaders’ backgrounds, social origins, education
and training might shed light on their actions to a focus on their orientations,
beliefs and values (see George, 1969; Holsti & Rosenau, 1998) or on their per-
sonalities and decision-making styles (e.g. Etheridge, 1978).1 Some of this
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work acknowledges, as we argue here, that while it is hard to deny the influ-
ence of individual leaders, at the same time, there is extensive evidence of the
environmental constraints on their actions.
Leaders have, however, been neglected in research on social policy and
welfare state expansion. That research has focused instead on the role of
economic development and modernisation (e.g. Wilensky, 1975), political
parties, class support and coalitions (e.g. Korpi, 2006), and institutions (see
Amenta, Bonastia, & Caren, 2001, and the Introduction to this special issue).
As Daniel Béland (2005) has noted in work focusing on the role of ideas, domi-
nant explanations in recent years have been in the historical institutionalist
tradition. While our study does not claim to be comprehensive or to system-
atically evaluate the role of leaders across all social policy areas in our four
countries, it highlights the neglected role that leaders have played in the
early twenty-first-century expansion of policies to tackle poverty and inequal-
ity in these four countries.
The utility of politics, and the issues of path dependency and
policy innovation
By emphasising politics and political leaders, we differ also from policy ana-
lysts with a technocratic turn of mind. They regard politics as an unhelpful
force that taints elegant policy blueprints with extraneous concerns, irration-
ality, untidiness and unpredictability. In their view, the formulation and
implementation of policies need to be insulated from politics and politicians,
from which little good can come.
They are mistaken on two counts. First, even when technocrats are in
command, politics – that is, the interplay of interests, actors and ideas in
the pursuit of power – is always present. Even strategies that try to insulate
policy processes are saturated by politics. Second, we have abundant evi-
dence – from documents, and field research including extensive interviews
with practitioners, some of whom were members of our research team – to
demonstrate that politicians often make constructive, rational contributions
to the design and implementation of policies. They do so mainly because
they believe that poverty programmes serve their political interests.2 They
operate in ways that are sensitive and responsive to the leverage, preferences
and needs of diverse interests: supporters of their policies, sceptical allies who
will nonetheless support them, opponents of their policies – and poor, mar-
ginalised groups, even though they may have little political influence. These
are not extraneous concerns. The political leaders and processes that we
have examined therefore tend strongly to contribute to another, more utilitar-
ian rationality – and to the sustainability of policies and to social justice.
Some analysts also argue that little new can be expected of politicians and
other policy-makers because they tend strongly to be locked into pre-existing
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patterns of behaviour and unwritten agreements between ruling elites and
various social forces. Those analysts stress the iron grip of ‘path dependency’
and the immense difficulties that stand in the way of policy innovation. The
evidence from our study raises serious doubts about such arguments.3
In three of our four countries – China, India and South Africa – the leaders
who intensified efforts to address poverty and inequality had to overcome
unhelpful political or policy legacies – inheritances from their immediate
(and earlier) predecessors. They sometimes had to tackle reluctance among
politicians and bureaucrats within their governments – especially in South
Africa and China where ruling parties did not change, so that fewer new
appointees were inserted into senior posts there than after elections in
Brazil in 2002 and India in 2004. They also had to challenge, to varying
degrees, pre-existing political understandings that favoured prosperous inter-
ests who were sometimes in league with complacent bureaucrats. In all four
governments, proposed poverty initiatives met with opposition from senior
figures, especially in finance ministries, who (like their counterparts across
the world) worried about the fiscal implications – and in some cases, from
ministries where initiatives would threaten the prerogatives and interests of
bureaucrats. In other words, most of the leaders we assessed had to break
free of ‘path dependency’, and to innovate – and they managed to achieve
this.
Only in Brazil did presidents Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, or ‘Lula’, between
2003 and 2011, and Dilma Rousseff thereafter, inherit a tradition of pro-
poor policies that had been put in place by Lula’s predecessor, Fernando
Henrique Cardoso (the leader of a progressive rival party), between 1994
and 2002 (Melo, Ng’ethe, & Manor, 2012). But even Lula’s government inno-
vated by introducing new initiatives that went beyond Cardoso’s. In the
other three cases, leaders had to struggle against far less helpful inheritances.
In China, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao took power in 2002–2003 after more than
a decade in which Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji’s administration had empha-
sised economic growth with an urban bias. That led to increasing economic
inequality, a relative neglect of rural areas and of the plight of poor people
(rural and urban), and mounting collective protests over injustices (see
Duckett & Wang, 2017). Hu andWen countered with an array of new initiatives
that extended programmes to disadvantaged groups and lifted the onerous
tax burden on rural dwellers.4 These innovations were intended both to
spur economic growth and to promote a ‘harmonious society’ – one of the
key slogans of their decade in power – by reducing distress, discontent and
worrying levels of instability.
In India, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Congress Party
introduced numerous programmes to benefit poorer groups who had been
largely ignored both by its main rival, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP),
which had led a ruling coalition between 1998 and 2004, and by the Congress
306 J. MANOR AND J. DUCKETT
itself in earlier periods. The key actors were Sonia Gandhi, who declined to
lead the government but headed a National Advisory Council (NAC) whose
members (see below) crafted several innovative programmes, and Prime Min-
ister Manmohan Singh who was hesitant about some programmes but whose
staff contained progressives who developed some others. These innovations
could be generously funded, thanks to a marked surge in government reven-
ues that began in 2003 and continues to this day. The UPA’s election victory in
2004 was erroneously attributed in the media to a revolt among the rural poor
against the policies of the previous BJP-led government. But the UPA set out
to make that myth a reality at the next election. It had some success in achiev-
ing that, although that was also over-stated in media assessments in 2009
(Manor, 2011). Its poverty initiatives, only some of which succeeded, added
up to a decidedly innovative approach.
In South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) had introduced certain
policies to benefit poor people after achieving dominance in the first fully
democratic election in 1994 – dominance that was not seriously challenged
until the municipal elections of 2016. But its initial, strongly pro-poor develop-
ment strategy – the ‘Reconstruction and Development Programme’ (RDP) –
was sidelined in 1996 in favour of a more market- and growth-oriented
approach, ‘Growth, Employment and Redistribution’ (GEAR), which prioritised
a reduction in the fiscal deficit, tackling inflation, the liberalisation of capital
flows and reductions in government expenditure. Resentments against
GEAR’s de-emphasis on poverty programmes developed within (and
beyond) the ANC, under the highly centralised leadership of Thabo Mbeki
(President, 1999–2008) (Seekings & Nattrass, 2006). Few major poverty
initiatives emerged in that period – although one which eventually had a
substantial impact (the child support grant, later augmented by grants to
other vulnerable groups) came into being thanks to the determination of
one entrepreneurial minister (with help from intellectuals and civil society)
to go against the grain of the ruling order (Groenmeyer, 2016). When Jacob
Zuma succeeded Mbeki, greater efforts to tackle poverty and inequality
were made – less as a result of pressure from Zuma than because his relax-
ation of tight control from the top permitted other senior figures to pursue
them. Cumulatively, their efforts amounted to a marked change from the
inheritance not just from the apartheid era but also from Mbeki’s ANC.
All four of these cases – especially China, India and South Africa – demon-
strate that political agency and policy entrepreneurship, the actions of leading
political actors, have the potential to break with ‘path dependency’ in innova-
tive ways. They achieved this in different ways. Leaders often presided over
groups of policy entrepreneurs who drew on ideas and experiences at
lower levels – within sub-national governments that had been controlled by
their parties – or within their parties’ forums, which were sometimes open
to ideas from progressive civil society organisations and scholars. For
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example, in Brazil, municipal and state governments headed by Lula’s
Worker’s Party had experimented with programmes from which new initiat-
ives were generated. In China, the party-state used experimental methods
to test policy innovations at lower levels (Heilmann, 2008). In India, prolonged
encounters in Rajasthan state between civil society organisations and state
governments (some of which were Congress-led) generated ideas that were
used by key members of Sonia Gandhi’s NAC to design the crucial
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA).
At other times (especially in India and South Africa where ruling parties had
developed fewer programmatic ideas), leaders innovated by commissioning
policy entrepreneurs – within and outside officialdom – to devise new initiat-
ives. An official in India’s Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) convened groups of
progressives who specialised in the problems of urban slum dwellers and
poor forest dwellers to help craft, respectively, the Jawaharlal Nehru National
Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) and the Forest Rights Act. In South Africa,
officials in government ministries accepted a proposal from closely associated
civil society activists and scholars for an adaptation of India’s MGNREGA.
In other cases, politicians became policy entrepreneurs themselves – most
notably when a minister in Mbeki’s government in South Africa worked with
progressive scholars and civil society organisations to launch the Child
Support Act. That entailed cash transfers which, when later extended to
other disadvantaged groups, had a major impact.
Leaders in the four countries seldom borrowed ideas from the other three.
South Africa was the main exception here. The Child Support Grant was
devised with Brazil’s cash transfers in mind, and (as noted) they also used
India’s MGNREGA as a model.
Situating leaders within political systems: coherence and
concentrations of power within governments
No government is monolithic. Multiple leaders and forces operate within
them, and external groups and power centres sometimes play roles in the for-
mulation and implementation of policies. So, we must consider the coherence
of these governments and the array of actors that influenced these processes.
(Complexities multiply when we move down to middle and lower levels in
these political systems, but since they are assessed in other papers in this col-
lection, we mainly focus here on the upper reaches). In some cases, senior
leaders were solidly united behind poverty programmes, but in others, power-
ful figures were lukewarm or opposed – so that contestation and occasional
subterfuge was required to launch and sustain an initiative.
Leaders atop these four systems differed from each other in the powers
that they and their parties possessed – relative to other leaders and forces.
In China, they led a party with no powerful rivals that permeates state
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structures to the point where scholars commonly refer to a ‘party-state’.
Top leaders – the Politburo Standing Committee of usually five to nine
people – operate on the principle of collective leadership and rarely reveal
any disunity, but by virtue of their positions as head of the Party and govern-
ment, respectively, the General Secretary (Hu Jintao) and Premier (Wen
Jiabao) were clearly pre-eminent.5 In South Africa, the ANC competes with
other parties, but it was plainly dominant within the political system until
mid-2016 – although as we see, while Thabo Mbeki was president (1999–
2008), proponents of poverty initiatives received limited support from him.
In India, the Congress Party exercised great power within the ruling coalition
that it led between 2004 and 2014, but it was allied to many (mainly regional)
parties, some of which had only limited interest in poverty initiatives. As we
shall see, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and some of his key colleagues
were sceptical and eventually even hostile to certain poverty programmes
that Congress leader Sonia Gandhi supported. In Brazil, the powerful presi-
dency was held by leaders of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores)
– Lula between 2003 and 2011, and Dilma Rousseff thereafter. But Brazil’s
political system divides power between the executive presidency and the
legislature or Congress where the Workers’ Party has never held anything
close to a majority. That system thus lacks the coherence of India’s
Westminster-style parliamentary system in which the executive and legisla-
ture are fused – never mind the South African system in which the dominance
of the ANC after 1994 trumped the formal division of powers between
executive and legislature, or China’s one-party system in which party and
state are fused.
However, in Brazil, another informal reality prevented the separation of
powers from imposing serious restraints upon the two presidents as they
sought to tackle poverty and inequality. This was a broad popular consensus
that had existed since the late 1980s in support of government efforts to
pursue these goals. So in Brazil, inter-party competition (until 2016) led less
to attempts by rival parties to restrain Workers’ Party presidents than to
experiments by rival parties, in lower level arenas that they controlled, to
devise initiatives that would address poverty and inequality. This crucial
informality – the broad consensus – left Lula and Dilma Rousseff less
constrained than their Indian counterparts in their creation and implemen-
tation of poverty initiatives.
We will shortly examine several key themes: leaders’ management of
conflicts within their governments; their motivations and calculations; the
political gains that they made by tackling poverty and inequality; their
approaches to the problems of corruption and clientelism; and their acuity
or ineptitude. But to prepare the ground for those discussions, let us first con-
sider how leaders’ roles changed as the political and policy processes moved
through successive stages.
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Leaders’ changing roles during three successive phases
It is necessary to analyse three phases in the political/policy process: initiat-
ives’ emergence or origins, and then their formulation and their implemen-
tation. (Their outcomes are discussed in a separate paper in this collection.)
Senior leaders’ roles changed as they moved through these three phases.
When we consider initiatives’ origins and formulation, we find that they had
great influence. But implementation mostly occurred at lower levels that
were largely out of sight and beyond their reach.
Readers will detect a shortage of comments on China here. That is inevita-
ble since the Chinese political system is much less transparent than the other
three. Especially in the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao era, the CCP strove to
portray its top leadership as acting collectively and hid evidence on the
roles played by individuals. Journalists sometimes suggest that their pro-
fessional experiences, which left them with a patent awareness of rural
poverty, helped to persuade Hu and Wen to develop new government initiat-
ives. Certainly, Hu Jintao had been Party Secretary of Guizhou, one of China’s
poorest, least industrialised interior provinces, while Wen Jiabao had been
Vice-premier responsible for rural affairs under the previous leadership,
where the farmers’ burden (of fees and taxes) had been closely monitored
for the protests it catalysed (Duckett & Wang, 2017). But Hu and Wen were
careful to portray party-state policy decisions as collectively produced and
to limit any suggestion of their personal influence. Moreover, although
there was a clear shift in overall policy direction towards providing for rural
dwellers under their leadership, there is also evidence that Jiang Zemin had
begun that shift from 2001. We are again short of details about their roles
during implementation, although it is apparent that – like their counterparts
in Brazil, India and South Africa – they had only limited involvement in it.
Government initiatives had complex origins. They emerged in part from
pressures applied by organised interests upon governments to address
poverty and inequality – sometimes buttressed by public advocates. Govern-
ments also faced pressure from within from activists who urged action in
order to attract votes (the main emphasis in Brazil and India) or to damp
down instability (in South Africa and China). Senior leaders sometimes paid
attention to promising experiments with poverty programmes in other
countries or, more often, at lower levels within their own systems. Chinese
leaders often drew upon the findings from trial runs of policy innovations
in certain localities or regions that were tested over extended periods – a prac-
tice that took more time than leaders elsewhere had available.6 But some
Chinese policy initiatives that we analysed were not based on extended
prior experiments.
In some cases, socialist or progressive ideals long espoused by ruling
parties played a part – although pragmatic calculations about the political
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utility of poverty programmes predominated outside Brazil. In South Africa
and India, ruling parties’ time-honoured rhetorical commitments to socialist
or social democratic ideals had not previously been translated into much
robust action. And the same could be said of China and the ruling party’s com-
munist ideals. But that rhetoric, in South Africa and Brazil at least, inspired
popular expectations of government action – within and beyond ruling
parties. Only in Brazil did a broad consensus exist in favour of efforts to
tackle inequality, and with it of course, poverty.
In all four countries, decisions to respond to these varied ‘origins’ were
mainly made by senior leaders. Even in China, where politics at the top are
opaque, the shift to tackling rural poverty and inequality has been attributed
to Hu and Wen grappling with their socialist inheritances (Holbig, 2009). In
Brazil, Lula’s government after 2002 set about demonstrating that it could
deliver on their (and his) long-standing promises to the poor by providing
even more than the progressive social democrats had during the preceding
eight years. In South Africa, there were clear limits on the fulfilment of the
ANC’s long-standing progressive rhetoric while Mbeki was president –
although some headway was made when one minister devised a cash transfer
scheme that acquired enough momentum to persuade the lukewarm presi-
dent to acquiesce (Groenmeyer, 2016). When Zuma succeeded Mbeki in
2008, his less control-oriented approach enabled progressives among minis-
ters, senior bureaucrats and civil society leaders to go further. In India after
2004, the traditional social democratic posturing of the Congress Party
(including Indira Gandhi’s promise to ‘abolish poverty’), which had seldom
been matched by substantive action, was again treated as a point of origin
and was given substance for the first time.
The formulation of poverty initiatives in these countries was also strongly
influenced by senior leaders, who in nearly all cases – especially outside
South Africa – helped to drive these processes forward, and had to approve
them before they came to fruition. But diverse actors below the very apex
of power both within and outside government also made important contri-
butions. The identities of these key actors varied somewhat between
countries. In China, for example, lower level influence was limited, and formu-
lation was left largely to ministries (even if they regularly draw on their
research offices and other think tanks as well as on some individual research-
ers). There is, however, evidence that in the case of NRCMS, vice-premiers
pushed the policy forward while ensuring that the State Council Office coor-
dinated the complex inter-ministerial process of negotiating and drafting the
policy documents (see Duckett, 2017).
In Brazil, Lula and his colleagues drew on intellectuals within and close to
the party and in progressive think tanks – and to a degree on civil society
organisations. Senior leaders in Brazil had, since 1984, been more amenable
to civil society than their counterparts in the other three countries. But
COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS 311
many of the programmes and processes that they introduced were modelled
closely on experiments that the Workers’ Party had undertaken when it held
power at lower levels of government – in states and municipalities. Senior
bureaucrats (who, when governments change, are fresh appointees to a
greater degree than in the other three countries) responded to what they
viewed as a new dawn in an entrepreneurial spirit – and so did Lula’s new
ministers (Melo, Pereira, & Pereira, 2016a, 2016b).
In India, the central government gave progressive intellectuals and civil
society leaders potent roles in the policy-making process for the first time –
most notably in the NAC that Sonia Gandhi chaired. A detailed plan for that
government’s flagship programme, the MGNREGA, emerged swiftly from
the NAC, thanks to detailed preparations made in advance by two of its
members – Aruna Roy, an eminent civil society leader, and Jean Drèze, a
scholarly advocate of poverty reduction who had worked closely with
Amartya Sen. Other such advocates from civil society organisations were
appointed to the Planning Commission. But the formulation of some new
initiatives was driven by progressive bureaucrats, notably one in the
PMO – R. Gopalakrishnan – who had co-authored a successful pro-poor
education guarantee scheme in a state that the Congress Party had governed.
His co-author of that scheme, Amita Sharma (Melo et al., 2012), was put in
charge of the day-to-day running of the MGNREGA. He facilitated the formu-
lation of the Forest Rights Act and the JNNURM by convening groups of
progressive policy advocates, public interest lawyers and civil society
leaders to assist – and then by lobbying within the PMO for these measures.7
In South Africa, the process was at times less open to actors from those three
categories. But progressive social scientists, backed by pressure from civil
society and elements of the ANC itself, played a decisive role in the formu-
lation and enactment of provisions for the Child Support Grant (Friedman
2016a). And a civil society leader who worked closely with key government
ministries was crucial to the creation of rural employment programme,
loosely modelled on India’s MGNREGA – again with strong backing from pro-
gressives within the ANC and from academics (Andersson & Alexander, 2016).
The discussion above of the origins and formulation of poverty initiatives
focused mainly on the upper reaches of the political and administrative
systems. That was appropriate because, while the origins included pressures
from below, nearly all the key decisions to proceed were made at or near
the apex of power. The same can be said of the formulation phase. But
things change when we consider implementation. It mainly occurs at inter-
mediate and lower levels – arenas which leaders at the top found difficult
to monitor and to influence.
One major problem for senior leaders (less so in China) was their inability to
obtain adequate, reliable information on the implementation of programmes.
It came from a diversity of sources, official and non-official. Formal monitoring
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committees were sometimes constituted, but their findings seldom resulted
in action by governments to change things. One particularly forlorn
example, which is not untypical, was the panel appointed to oversee India’s
JNNURM. It found executive agencies so unresponsive that it sought its
own dissolution.8 Government ministries also passed information up to
senior leaders, but it was often tailored to show that implementation is pro-
ceeding satisfactorily, so that those leaders were left flying half-blind.
Opposition parties offered some critiques of the implementation of gov-
ernment initiatives, but their impact was quite limited. There are no mean-
ingful opposition parties in China, and the South African opposition was
usually imperiously ignored. In India, it was (surprisingly) rather unusual
for opposition parties to voice sharp criticisms of implementation –
especially of the crucial MGNREGA – because state governments that they
controlled in that federal system were themselves engaged in implementing
poverty programmes, often enthusiastically.9 In Brazil, opposition parties
were loath to complain too bitterly about poverty initiatives because
doing so risked unpopularity by challenging the popular consensus in
favour of such programmes.
Information also emerged at times from within ruling parties, mainly in
South Africa and India. Critiques sometimes came from progressives. In
South Africa, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (which is part of
the ANC) voiced concerns, but their complaints had less to do with implemen-
tation than with the failure to formulate more poverty programmes.10
In India, progressive Members of Parliament from the ruling Congress Party
helped to ensure that an attempt by executive agencies (which Congress
dominated) to dilute the provisions of the MGNREG Act at the formulation
stage was thwarted before it became law. Thereafter, they sometimes
applied pressure to ensure proper implementation of that and other pro-
grammes. Progressive ministers – like some of their counterparts in Brazil,
South Africa and perhaps China (where evidence is harder to come by) –
sought to make the poverty initiatives that they administered work well
(Groenmeyer, 2016; Pereira, 2016).
But once implementation began, most critiques from within India’s (intern-
ally heterogeneous) Congress Party came from conservatives – from people
representing prosperous industrialists or landowners. They voiced doubts
about substantial spending on poverty initiatives in general and, more specifi-
cally, about the MGNREGA, which allegedly drove up the cost of agricultural
labour. That programme was so popular that landowners’ critiques were dis-
missed. But their anxieties about heavy expenditures were shared by Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh and officials in the finance ministry, and helped
to trigger cuts in the outlay for several poverty programmes, including the
MGNREGA, in 2013–2014.11 (This was a very rare example in these four
countries of a reduction in expenditure on a poverty initiative.) Industrialists’
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lobbying also persuaded Singh to take radical action to undermine the
implementation of the Forest Rights Act in that same period – to grant indus-
trialists access to sites within forested areas. In doing so, he overrode both the
law and two progressive cabinet ministers.12
The media also provided information – and at times, misinformation. Those
which specialised in financial matters – especially in South Africa and India –
voiced scepticism about the cost and the allegedly faulty implementation of
programmes. Some of these interventions were wildly erroneous.13 But the
print media in Brazil, India and South Africa also gave space to progressive
commentators who supported poverty initiatives, and whose critical com-
ments on implementation were intended to enhance their impact. Even in
China, where the media are more constrained, journalists also acted as advo-
cates for the rural poor (Bernstein & Lü, 2000).
Civil society organisations also provided reports based on their research
and activities in the field – in Brazil, South Africa and especially India. (There
was precious little of this in China where such organisations are tightly con-
strained.) These were for the most part supportive – and their criticisms
were, again, aimed at improving implementation. Very occasionally, civic
organisations on the left published damning analyses of poverty initiatives
because they did not meet their unrealistic expectations of perfection,14 but
these counted for little.
The judiciary occasionally intervened to tackle implementation problems.
But courts’ importance was limited in China where the party-state has
vastly more power, and in Brazil where the Workers’ Party organisation
counted for more. Judges were more active in South Africa, but they
stopped short of exerting a major influence on social policy (Friedman,
2016b). Only in India did an activist and unusually intrusive Supreme Court
appoint its own commissioners to monitor implementation.15
When information reached those at the apex of power indicating the need
for action to overcome problems, long delays sometimes occurred because
complex consultations had first to take place. For example, when civil servants
managing the implementation of India’s MGNREGA informed the PMO of a
serious design fault that had opened the way for corruption near the local
level, it took fully 11 months to get cabinet approval for corrective action –
and even then, it was watered down by sceptical senior ministers. Bureaucrats
made several other quite crucial changes in the implementing ministry, but
that occurred beyond the purview of leaders atop the system.16 Action on
information ensued more swiftly in the other three countries, but this
remained something of a problem.
One last source both of information on implementation, and of assistance
in acting to improve it, needs to be noted, partly because it existed in strength
only in Brazil. When elected councils at lower levels – at local and (more
importantly in this connection) at intermediate levels – were given significant
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powers and resources, they could feed information to leaders at higher levels
and then act to address implementation problems (Manor, 2013). Brazil’s
councils, which had been strong since the 1990s, were able to serve as the
eyes and ears of politicians and civil servants closer to the apex of power
and to tackle problems once those leaders urged action (Melo et al., 2012).
In a small number of Indian regions, they also had the capacity to do this.
But the empowerment of elected councils attracted resistance from legislators
and politicians so that in a telling instance, the senior politician who under-
took most promising experiment with such generous devolution was even-
tually forced to disempower elected councils. This deprived him of reliable
information at the intermediate level and of the help of elected councils in
tackling problems, a change which contributed to his defeat at the next elec-
tion (Manor, 2004). In China and South Africa, elected councils or other office
holders could make no such contribution. The Chinese party-state experimen-
ted briefly with elections in townships – the lowest administrative level – but
then abandoned them.17 In South Africa, local councils created in 2000 were
provided with such inadequate powers and resources, and were subjected to
such onerous technocratic tasks (as a result of elite distrust of the rustics who
would be elected as councillors), that they were crippled at birth (Siddle &
Koelble, 2012).
Divisions and tensions within governments
Tensions and even outright contestation within ruling parties over poverty
programmes were most evident in India and South Africa. In India’s parlia-
mentary system, Sonia Gandhi declined ministerial posts, but served as presi-
dent of the Congress Party and convenor of the multi-party ruling coalition
that it led – the UPA. As we have noted, she inserted Manmohan Singh as
Prime Minister (Ruparelia, 2015). By drawing on civil society leaders and
public interest lawyers in the development of several poverty programmes,
India’s UPA provided greater space for multiple actors than did its counter-
parts in Brazil, China and South Africa.
Sonia Gandhi’s partnership with Prime Minister Singh was often comp-
lementary. But polite contestation also occurred because he (and the execu-
tive agencies that he oversaw) tended to be sceptical about the radical
character and financial cost of some proposed initiatives. At times, that scep-
ticism inspired actions which impeded the workings of some poverty initiat-
ives – especially when Singh undermined one of them, the Forest Rights
Act (noted above). He also allowed his finance minister to curtail funding
for the crucial MGNREGA as the 2014 election approached – to reduce govern-
ment debt. This bordered on political insanity since many poorer voters were
affected.18 Political ineptitude sometimes matters in our analyses (see below),
and the UPA suffered a significant defeat at that election.19
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South Africa offers a more vivid example of a leader at the very apex of
power who was hesitant or even hostile to anti-poverty initiatives: Thabo
Mbeki (1998–2008) pursued market-oriented policies (Aron, 2011; Gevisser,
2009, chapter 30). Mbeki exercised what appeared to be airtight, top-down
control. But even during his presidency, some efforts were made to address
poverty, in, for example, the provision of water and housing to impoverished
townships and squatter colonies, both of which Mbeki supported. And one
major initiative, an important case study in our analyses – the Child Support
Grant – emerged. Mbeki and his colleagues atop the system were lukewarm
towards this policy, but one minister was determined to bring it into being, in
part to burnish his personal legacy. He received crucial assistance from civil
society organisations and an official panel headed by a progressive social
scientist, Francine Lund, which provided evidence of the promise of such a
grant. That initiative was then supplemented by grants to other disadvan-
taged groups, and the cumulative impact on income poverty has been
significant (Friedman, 2016a; Groenmeyer, 2016; Seekings & Nattrass, 2006).
(See the study in this collection of ‘Outcomes’.)
After Mbeki was ousted by opponents within the ANC in 2008, Jacob Zuma
succeeded him as president. He was less hesitant about poverty initiatives, but
the main change that attended this transition arose less from his efforts to
promote such programmes than from the space that Zuma provided to
other leaders to undertake them. The ANC remained dominant within the pol-
itical system until municipal elections in mid-2016, but it and the government
that it led became less monolithic and more amenable to poverty initiatives
under Zuma.
In China, between 2003 and 2013, President (and, more importantly, party
General Secretary) Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao worked in tandem, with
neither man playing a dominant role – as current President and General Sec-
retary Xi Jinping has done. As with their predecessors, President and General
Secretary Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji, they differed in their tasks
(with the Premier heading the government and leading on economic and
social policy) and their personal styles, and they were complementary
figures. Under Jiang and Zhu, however, social policy focused on the cities
and especially targeted urban state sector workers, though towards the end
of their administration they introduced the Western Development Project
to benefit underdeveloped inland regions, announced ‘new’ rural cooperative
medical schemes, and began rural tax reforms (Birney, 2014; Duckett, 2017;
Wang, 2017).
Motivations: leaders’ altruism and calculations
Any discussion of the motivations of senior politicians is fraught with diffi-
culties. We cannot see into their minds or – in most cases – accurately
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gauge the strength of their commitment to various ideals and principles.
We can consider their public statements, but words do not always reflect
actual beliefs. It is safer to judge them by their actions. But even if we
focus there, it is hard to see whether certain decisions are mainly driven
by long-standing progressive idealism (which motivated only some of
these leaders) or short- to medium-term political calculations (which
usually predominated).
Let us take a few tentative steps into this minefield. The political leaders
who oversaw the intensified efforts to tackle poverty and inequality in
these four countries were neither strangers to altruism nor saints. Most of
them took some satisfaction from creating initiatives that would help the
poor, but they also made hard-headed reckonings about the political gains
which would ensue for them as individuals and for their parties and govern-
ments. Considerations of self-interest and partisan advantage usually out-
weighed socialist or humanitarian idealism. (See the next section on ‘Good
Politics’.) But as cases from all four countries demonstrate, enlightened
approaches to poverty and inequality emerged.
Senior politicians were also motivated by a belief that poverty initiatives
were feasible, especially financially. They rightly concluded that government
revenues were sufficient to the task. Revenues were surging in India (as
they continue to do), and abundant in China. They were less plentiful in
Brazil and South Africa, but leaders regarded them as adequate. (Recent econ-
omic downturns have created strains in both countries – excruciating strains
in Brazil – but poverty initiatives have not suffered cuts as a result, although
those who ousted Dilma Rousseff in 2016 have begun this). So, politicians
introduced such initiatives in part because – financially – they could.
Administrative feasibility was sometimes less certain, especially in South
Africa and India, but senior politicians there believed that instruments
existed or could be created that would enable implementation. This proved
to be an especially thorny problem in India. Its flagship programme, the
MGNREGA, was shrewdly designed (and then amended once implementation
began) to ensure administrative feasibility, although it was attended by some
disappointments (Jenkins & Manor, 2017). But the availability of ample reven-
ues led leaders there to pour money into some other poverty initiatives
without adequate attention to programme design or administrative struc-
tures.20 That undermined their effectiveness. (See the paper in this collection
on ‘Outcomes’.)
Sonia Gandhi was not intimately familiar with administrative matters – and
that contributed to this problem. But her motivations are worth considering.
They emerged in part from the years in which she had shared a house with her
mother-in-law, Indira Gandhi, who made (mostly empty) promises to tackle
poverty. That and her years as the wife of Rajiv Gandhi – an inept, confused
Prime Minister – had acquainted her with the progressive rhetoric of the
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Congress Party. The policies that emerged from the NAC that she chaired, and
in some cases from government ministries, went much further than previous
Congress governments in addressing poverty, and she regarded them as
efforts to lend substance to the dynasty’s claims to be progressive.
In South Africa, the ANC government’s adoption of the market-oriented
GEAR development strategy demonstrated Mbeki’s reluctance to prioritise
social programmes. Despite that, actions made by some ministries to tackle
poverty and inequality – like the creation of the Child Support Grant – went
against the grain of that government. Only when Zuma replaced Mbeki in
2009 did senior leaders find space to pursue a wider array of poverty initiatives
unencumbered from atop the system. Socialist idealism – not least among
powerful interests within the ANC – played some part in this, as did the
strong progressive commitments of civil society leaders and pro-poor cam-
paigners. And as ANC anxieties slowly grew about threats from rival parties,
poverty initiatives were increasingly perceived as politically advantageous.
It is difficult to credit Chinese leaders with socialist idealism when their pol-
icies after 1979 turned one of the most egalitarian countries on earth into one
where inequality had increased markedly. The concentrations of wealth in
private hands – often in the hands of members of the ruling party elite –
raise questions about the use of the word ‘Communist’ to describe that
party. When Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao introduced changes that benefited
poor people, they were almost certainly aware that rising inequalities sat
uneasily with the CCP’s formal ideology. But they also sought to cultivate per-
sonal legacies as leaders who had mitigated problems created during the pre-
ceding Jiang Zemin administration. Under Jiang, taxes and informal fees had
increased the burdens on rural dwellers (both poor and prosperous) as local
governments became more predatory. That created dangerous tensions
between cadres of the party-state and ordinary folk, and eroded the legiti-
macy of the regime (Duckett & Wang, 2017). Jiang’s government had also
paid too little attention to the distress of tens of millions of rural–urban
migrants who posed a potential threat to public order (Howell, 2016). When
these problems began to be seen also as a drag on economic growth, Hu
and Wen responded with an array of ameliorative initiatives, with consider-
able confidence that the party-state possessed the administrative capability
to make them work tolerably well (Duckett & Wang, 2017).
In Brazil, President Lula took power in 2002 after a long political career
grounded in promises to meet the needs of the poor. His commitment to
that ideal is doubted by few observers, and in any case, his emphasis on
this theme had created widespread expectations of actions to pursue it –
so he also faced popular pressure. He succeeded a social democratic prede-
cessor who had introduced significant pro-poor initiatives before him, so he
also felt compelled to go further in order to justify his claim to be the principal
champion of the poor (Melo et al., 2016a). Thus, for Lula and his chosen
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successor, Dilma Rousseff, pro-poor commitment and political compulsions
reinforced one another. Both leaders assumed, largely accurately, that insti-
tutions that had implemented poverty programmes since the mid-1990s
were capable of delivering adequately.
‘Good politics’
The leaders who undertook or reinforced initiatives to tackle poverty and
inequality thought that this amounted to ‘good politics’ – that they, their
governments and their parties would benefit politically as a result. They antici-
pated that their popularity and legitimacy would be enhanced, that votes
(if they needed them) would be won, and that popular discontents among
the poor (a cause of instability) would be eased. Our evidence indicates that
for the most part, at least some of the gains that they anticipated duly
followed, although several initiatives proved to be disappointments – not
least in India.
The leaders’ expectations presupposed the financial and administrative
feasibility of such initiatives. We have found that those presuppositions
were, with certain exceptions, well founded. As noted above, all four govern-
ments had sufficient revenues to undertake these initiatives – especially in
China and India, but also in Brazil and South Africa. Budgets have become
tighter still in those two countries, amid recent economic downturns, but
resources were adequate through the period up to 2015 that we have
studied. On the administrative front, incapacities created problems in the
implementation of certain programmes – especially in South Africa and India.
Incapacities also generated anxieties in those two countries. Two types of
worries arose in South Africa. There was scepticism about the capacity of the
less-than-agile bureaucracy to manage certain programmes, but these were
mitigated somewhat by the relatively straightforward design of the key
social grants initiatives (cash transfers, favoured there and in Brazil, and
used in China but not in India) (Friedman, 2016a; Groenmeyer, 2016; Seekings,
2011). There were also concerns about the implementation of the Community
Work Programme. It was loosely modelled on India’s MGNREGA, but South
Africa’s elected local councils had been starved of resources and autonomy,
so they were too weak to play the key roles that their stronger Indian counter-
parts performed. Instead, civil society organisations operating at the grass-
roots were drawn in, and the system worked tolerably well.
In India, the MGNREGA functioned reasonably well where state govern-
ments in that federal system made efforts to implement it effectively – as
many, though not all, did. This owed much to the programme’s strong
transparency mechanisms (see details in the following section), which
impeded malfeasance among government employees and elected local
councillors at lower levels. But in a small number of states, severe problems
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in the bureaucracy led to dismal implementation. Most notable was Bihar,
where political leaders pressed for effective implementation but found that
they could spend little more than half of the funds provided from New
Delhi because nearly half of the key administrative posts at sub-district
level stood vacant.21 Administrative problems proved quite damaging in
three other Indian programmes. Poor drafting of the Forest Rights Act
created opportunities for the hostile Forest Service to thwart the implemen-
tation of nearly all of its provisions (and the Prime Minister himself
flagrantly violated the Act after 2011) (Manor, 2016). The anti-poverty pro-
visions of the JNNURM suffered in its early years because a senior bureaucrat
mainly implemented one of them at the expense of the others (Chiriyankan-
dath, 2016).22 Government support for the Integrated Child Development
Services consisted mainly of pumping greatly increased funds into a set of
institutions which had long malfunctioned and in which proposed administra-
tive reforms had only a limited impact, with disappointing results (Maiorano,
2016).
These problems in South Africa and India did not prevent the leaders
and governments from reaping some political benefits from their efforts to
tackle poverty and inequality. Very large numbers of poor South Africans
benefited from social grants, and non-trivial numbers gained from other
initiatives. The ANC was not (until mid-2016) as acutely concerned with
attracting votes as were the ruling parties in the more competitive systems
in Brazil and India, but it took satisfaction from the small increase in its
already substantial vote share at the 2014 parliamentary election. In
India, vast numbers of poor villagers earned decent wages under the
MGNREGA – tens of billions of person-days were worked after 2006. The
media erroneously claimed that that programme won re-election for the
ruling alliance in 2009, but it helped to ensure a majority that would
survive until 2014 when scandals and political blunders sent it down to a
severe election defeat (Manor, 2011).
In Brazil, with its broad popular consensus in favour of efforts to address
poverty and inequality, the Workers’ Party initiatives were extremely impor-
tant at two presidential elections. They facilitated Lula’s substantial re-election
triumph in 2010 and Dilma Rousseff’s narrower victory in 2014. (Those initiat-
ives played little part in the attacks on those two leaders seen in 2016, and the
consensus will restrain any successor who contemplates slashing those pro-
grammes.) China’s various initiatives – not least the lifting of the onerous
tax burden on rural dwellers – lent substance to the pursuit of a ‘harmonious
society’, stressed by Hu and Wen. They did not reverse the increase in collec-
tive protests – over 100,000 in 2012, according to official statements – that
had persuaded leaders to spend more on coercive agencies to deal with
‘instability’ than on national defence. But they may have eased some of the
discontents that generated such ructions.
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Dealing with corruption and clientelism
Most senior leaders who undertook poverty initiatives, or in some cases,
people who worked closely with them, tended strongly to recognise the
dangers posed by two things: corruption and clientelism. If subordinates
fleece programmes for private profit, they reduce the resources that can
make an impact on poverty and inequality. The same happens if resources
are diverted by subordinates to distribute among their clients. That may
strengthen the bonds between a ruling party and those clients (who often
have networks of sub-clients). But poverty initiatives seek to benefit – and
to cultivate popular political support from – much larger groups of recipients
than can be reached through even the most elaborate clientelist networks.
For these reasons, senior politicians often seek to protect poverty
programmes from corruption and clientelism. In doing so, they turn those pro-
grammes into ‘post-clientelist initiatives’ (Manor, 2013b). Leaders in three of
our four countries used different devices to achieve this. In South Africa’s
key social grants initiative, and in Brazil’s crucial Bolsa Familia programme,
they used advances in information technology to channel cash transfers to
recipients – with the aim of cutting out middlemen who might skim off
funds.23
In India’s most important and successful initiative, the MGNREGA, an elab-
orate IT system was used to disburse payments to workers’ bank accounts for
labour performed on public works projects. But that programme – which
sought to give any rural household the right to demand 100 days of work
per year as a hedge against destitution – went further, using IT to enhance
transparency as a counterweight to corrupt acts at and just above the local
level. Every worker had a paper ‘job card’ showing the dates, hours worked
and wages earned on the programme, and a similar electronic record for
each worker enabled checks for disparities. Other transparency mechanisms
were also used – most notably ‘social audits’, local-level mass meetings to
evaluate (inter alia) conformity with regulations. These transparency mechan-
isms – which were progressively tightened over time – had considerable
effect, so that it became harder to steal from the MGNREGA than any other
Indian programme (Jenkins & Manor, 2017). But such mechanisms were
scarcely used in the other three countries, or in other Indian initiatives.
In China, the initiatives of Hu and Wen were less concerned with cliente-
lism, but where possible, used new technologies to reduce the chances of
local officials siphoning off funds. The reform and then the abolition of rural
taxation was inspired in part by concerns about predation by local officials,
and it was in part such concerns that had led Zhu Rongji in the 1990s to
dismiss proposals for rural pensions and rural cooperative medical schemes
(Duckett & Wang, 2017). Under Hu and Wen, it was precisely the use of exper-
imentation when developing or gradually rolling out new initiatives that
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enabled the leadership to evaluate possible problems due to local govern-
ment incapacity or corruption.
Leaders: adroit or inept?
When we discuss the impact of senior leaders’ political dexterity or missteps on
social programmes, we need to make a key distinction noted above. Leaders
loom large during the formulation phase, but their influence diminishes
once implementation begins. When initiatives are being formulated, senior
political leaders often seek out constructive proposals and then strengthen
them and make them more feasible – administratively, politically and finan-
cially. Or, less often, they may seek to dilute them. They often exert pressure
to bring programmes into being by mustering support from allies and dis-
couraging opponents from undermining them. If they are adroit, they can
have a decidedly positive impact. President Lula shrewdly steered his
poverty initiatives through Congress, Brazil’s national legislature, where his
party never enjoyed a majority. This was a complex business that required
great subtlety in negotiations, horse-trading, and a degree of intimidation.24
But sometimes, leaders’ inattention to detail or blunders caused damage
during the formulation phase – although occasionally and ironically, these
things proved constructive. In India, Sonia Gandhi unwisely decided that the
Forest Rights Bill should be rushed into law, to deny opponents time to
muster resistance. But things proceeded with such haste that the resulting
Act was poorly drafted. It thus included one clause that largely negated its con-
structive impact (Manor, 2016). In South Africa, by contrast, Jacob Zuma’s acces-
sion to the presidency in 2009 brought in a leader who was much less attentive
to the details of subordinates’ actions than his predecessor, Mbeki, and even
though he was not a strong advocate of poverty reduction, that opened up
space andopportunities for them todevise and introduce poverty programmes.
Once the implementation of initiatives begins, however, politicians operat-
ing from atop large, complex systems seldom have much influence because
that process is largely beyond their reach. They may adjust such programmes
to make them more effective, and they may take action to undermine
opponents of those initiatives. But day-to-day developments mostly occur
in lower-level arenas where subordinate politicians, bureaucrats and other
actors shape events beyond the purview of leaders at the apex of power.
There are a few exceptions to this generalisation, but only a few. Consider
first a positive and then two negative examples from India. PrimeMinister Man-
mohan Singh persuaded cabinet colleagues in 2010 to make a change in the
rules governing India’s MGNREGA that undermined efforts by actors at lower
levels to siphon off funds from the programme. But then, by contrast, he per-
mitted cuts in funds for that same programme after 2011 (which, as noted
above, contributed to his party’s defeat at the 2014 election), andhe responded
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to pressure from industrialists by undertaking gross violations of the Forest
Rights Act.25 Such interventions during the implementation phase are,
however, quite rare. Usually, themost that senior politicians can do is to encou-
rage subordinates to pursue programmes effectively, apply pressure for com-
pliance, monitor events as best they can, and hope for the best.
The actions of political leaders had a major impact on intensified efforts to
tackle poverty and inequality in these countries. ‘Political agency’ mattered.
Innovations in three of the four countries enabled leaders and governments
to break free of ‘path dependency’. As a result, ‘politics’ – which technocrats
bemoan – was turned to constructive purposes in the struggle to promote
social justice.
Leaders in these four countries differed in their backgrounds, inheritances
and outlooks. They engaged differently with different political systems and
socio-economic circumstances. The capabilities of their party organisations
and governments varied. There were further variations in the powers that
they wielded, and in their management of tensions within their governments,
and within their political systems more generally. They tackled poverty and
inequality in somewhat different ways.
But they also had things in common. They all felt driven to develop poverty
initiatives by rising inequality. They all believed that this was feasible, and that
it would prove politically advantageous – as indeed it did. Hard-headed pol-
itical calculations almost always predominated over altruism in their minds,
but the two things did not entirely contradict one another. Some were
more adroit than others, but all were sufficiently skilled and shrewd to
make significant headway in redistributing wealth, reducing poverty, and
reaching the poorest of the poor.
Notes
1. Some recent political science research in this vein includes Mondak (2010),
Gerber, Huber, Doherty, and Dowling (2011), discussed by Jervis (2013).
2. Barry Ames (1987) argues that political leaders in Latin America use public policy
(and especially public expenditure) for political survival. This is rational but more
self-serving than altruism. For a similar assessment of leaders in Brazil, Uganda
and India, see Melo et al. (2012), whose study was inspired in part by an
earlier analysis that focused solely on Latin America by Ascher (1984).
3. For more in that vein, see Burns (2003).
4. Note, however, that Jiang Zemin did back the adoption of New Rural Coopera-
tive Medical Schemes in 2002 (see Duckett & Wang, 2017).
5. Note that the collective leader principle appears weaker under current Party
General Secretary Xi Jinping than it was under Hu and Wen.
6. For an introduction to that Chinese process, see Heilmann (2008). For an expla-
nation of how leaders elsewhere lacked the time for such procedures, see Manor
(2016).
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7. The JNNURM was based in part upon an initiative developed in different state
under Congress Party government, the Bangalore Agenda Task Force. The
leader of a formidable civil society organisation in that city which grew out of
that initiative – Janaagraha – played a key role in that programme’s design
and in monitoring it once implementation began (Manor, 2007).
8. Interviews with two panel members, New Delhi, 7 and 9 August 2014.
9. Caustic comments from the main opposition party, the BJP, on the implemen-
tation of the MGNREGA only arose in 2013 when Narendra Modi began to
lead it. His denunciations ignored the fact that BJP state governments had
achieved substantial successes in administering that programme – in for
example, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh (Jenkins & Manor, 2017).
10. For a scorching critique from that quarter, see Business Day, 18 October 2012.
Such criticisms helped to persuade the government to introduce an employ-
ment generation programme for rural areas (Andersson & Alexander, 2016).
11. Interview with a cabinet minister who opposed these cuts, New Delhi, 7 February
2014.
12. Interview with one of those cabinet ministers, New Delhi, 7 February 2014, and
with an official in the PMO, New Delhi, 10 February 2014.
13. Surjit Bhalla’s extravagant misrepresentations in the Indian Express are dissected
in Jenkins and Manor (2017).
14. For a deeply misleading example dealing with India’s MGNREGA, see Rai (2008),
which is subject to a detailed refutation in Jenkins and Manor (2017).
15. For more detail on courts, see the paper in this collection by Steven Friedman
and Diego Maiorano.
16. Eight interviews with those civil servants in New Delhi between January 2007
and March 2010.
17. We are grateful to Joseph Fewsmith for this information.
18. Interviewwith a cabinet minister who was alarmed by this, NewDelhi, 7 February
2014.
19. Centre for the Study of Developing Societies polling data showed that
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and poor rural dwellers, all of whom
benefitted disproportionately from the MGNREGA, often failed to vote for the
UPA or voted for the NDA/BJP (see Jenkins & Manor, 2017).
20. This was especially apparent in the case of India’s Integrated Child Development
Services (Maiorano, 2016). See also the report ‘CAG Audit Reveals Lapses in ICDS
Implementation’, The Hindu, 6 March 2013.
21. Interview with N.C. Saxena, New Delhi, 8 February 2014.
22. See also, ‘Only 22 Housing Projects for the Poor Completed under JNNURM’,
India Sanitation Portal, 30 November 2012.
23. For a broader perspective on the problem of corruption in South Africa, see
Camerer (2011). On Brazil, see Melo, Pereira and Pereira (2016), and Pereira (2016).
24. The complexities that Brazilian presidents face in their dealings with Congress
are explained in a study of Lula’s predecessor in chapter four of Melo et al.
(2012), pp.115–162.
25. See (Manor, 2016); and “Ease Norms for Clearing Infrastructure Projects: PMO to
MoEF”, Indian Express, 11 October 2012.
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